Breaking Free

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The common pattern across all of these seems to be filesystem and network ACLs enforced by the OS, not a separate kernel or hardware boundary. A determined attacker who already has code execution on your machine could potentially bypass Seatbelt or Landlock restrictions through privilege escalation. But that is not the threat model. The threat is an AI agent that is mostly helpful but occasionally careless or confused, and you want guardrails that catch the common failure modes - reading credentials it should not see, making network calls it should not make, writing to paths outside the project.

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It is also worth remembering that compute isolation is only half the problem. You can put code inside a gVisor sandbox or a Firecracker microVM with a hardware boundary, and none of it matters if the sandbox has unrestricted network egress for your “agentic workload”. An attacker who cannot escape the kernel can still exfiltrate every secret it can read over an outbound HTTP connection. Network policy where it is a stripped network namespace with no external route, a proxy-based domain allowlist, or explicit capability grants for specific destinations is the other half of the isolation story that is easy to overlook. The apply case here can range from disabling full network access to using a proxy for redaction, credential injection or simply just allow listing a specific set of DNS records.

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"In other countries they might spend a lot of time at work, but that doesn't mean they work a lot. Changing the culture and the mindset is the biggest challenge."。服务器推荐是该领域的重要参考

2024年12月23日 星期一 新京报